tween body and soul in each of the chapters: For authors like Egan and Rickli the soul–body dualism remains resolutely in place; for others the relationship is more slippery. For example, Cimpric casts the relationship as a “codependent” (110) and skilfully explicates the way in which tālimbi conceptualisations challenge both the idea of a singular body and of a dualism between body and soul.

One of the most theoretically astute chapters in the volume, Voss’s “Interpretation of Bodily Experience in Anthropology and among Mediumistic Healers in Germany,” explores the difficulty of interpreting experiences held during contemporary Shamanic journeying. This analysis both considers the phenomenological experience and the framework through which it produces / is given meaning; providing a lucid critique of Csordas’ (Somatic Modes of Attention. Cultural Anthropology 1993.8: 135–156) conception of the “other” in the process.

Locality was an important thematic for many of the contributors, including the process of movement through a landscape (such as pilgrimage); of “journey” more broadly; of remoteness; and crucially of exchange and modification developing in practices from the same tradition when undertaken in differing locations. Knibbe, in an engaging style, examines the dynamic between personal embodiment and the “global geography of conversion” (94) in Pentecostalism. In doing so she articulates a local “embodied” resistance to global agendas.

It is not surprising that a volume like this contains many careful readings of the body/bodies and detailed articulation of its movements and sensory experiences. It is in Roussou’s articulation of “Performed Religiosity in Contemporary Greece” that the crucial thematic of perception is most clearly represented. As a central element in understanding religious experience of embodiment and materiality (empirical and metaphysical) this thematic is curiously underdeveloped in other chapters.

Closing the volume, Spiegel and Sponheuer lament the lack of recognition between “esoteric” theories of body and soul (crucially for them, Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophy) and post-structuralist renegotiations of Cartesian dualism. This is not a lone cry; many have noted the synergy between esotericism and post-structuralism (an undertaking of which I am myself guilty). With the esoteric traditions’ emphasis on the intermediary (as space, place, process, experience, etc.) and penchant for the “third” or ternary (even if these are also conceptually troubling) this thematic is curiously underdeveloped in other chapters.

Images in Frederiksen’s text – for example, a desolate door placed on the beach that his informant Emil says leads to a “parallel world” (2), ruins in the water (25), ruins on the street (31), a signpost pointing nowhere (42) – resonant with the discussion of ruins, temporality, and the fragility of masculinity in post-Soviet space. A third modality evocatively runs through the monograph in italicized text, slanting towards the ache of shared time and loss: transitory semi-remains, ephemeral allegories, and mundane meetings. Use of italics as a stylized form of contrastive narration is rarely as successfully executed as Frederiksen’s, which manages to enliven both the chronologically unfolding tales of his informants’ lives and the sensitive theoretical account of haunting, temporality, and social ruin.

Frederiksen’s treatment of boredom is most reminiscent of Jervis et al. (Boredom, “Trouble,” and the Realities of Postcolonial Reservation Life. Ethos 31.2003: 38–58) in which they emphasize how boredom and “trouble” become intertwined on a Northern Plains American Indian reservation. Though boredom appears in Frederi-
sen’s book title, it does not constitute a central theoretical axis in the text itself, except insofar as it is shorthand for the various forms of longing his informants experience. Another recent contribution to theorizing boredom in post-socialist space comes from Bruce O’Neill (Cast Aside. Boredom and Downward Mobility, and Homelessness in Post-Communist Bucharest, Romania. Cultural Anthropology 29.2014: 8–31), which explores discourses of boredom among the homeless population in Bucharest. Despite differing approaches and populations, both O’Neill and Frederiksen treat boredom as emerging in relation to temporality, and particularly as related in some fashion to social marginality and exclusion. Where-as O’Neill contends that boredom emerges as the lead affective state for his homeless informants due to exclusion from practices of consumption that increasingly come to form the dominant mode of sociality within this urban space, Frederiksen talks about “[h]aunting, afterlives, and temporal margins” (179) as possible alternatives that can move beyond the dilemma of structure/agency in accounting for the temporal and material positions of his informants with respect to their own experiences.

Despite the virtues of Frederiksen’s push past a rigid structure/agency conception of the emergence of subjectivities and affective dispositions, central categories within his account – time and youth – would benefit from elaboration of their fixed (or definitional) structural elements. For example, in Batumi, seasonality is crucial in reckoning the two “sides” of the place: we find a summer resort bustling with tourists opposed to an empty winter nothingness in which “dark” worlds emerge. How do other temporal rhythms or recurrences, such as holidays, daily patterns, or weekly rituals (de)stabilize ghostly presences? The cyclical changing of the seasons, for example, seems unlike the accrual of Post-it notes above the fireplace in Emil’s living room (124), or the death of Magu, the tattoo artist (121). The category of youth also deserves a more direct treatment or delimitation. Most of Frederiksen’s informants are in their early twenties. To understand the force of the discussion of temporality, it may be useful to know what other socially significant age-groupings exist within Batumi, and how they are related to “youth.” Frederiksen notes that fatherhood forms a certain kind of edge at which one unquestionably assumes the status and responsibilities of being an adult. This suggests that (social) institutional factors may carve out or naturalize phases of life.

A more pressing question concerns the relationship between the informants with whom Frederiksen spent his time, and the university students against whom they are, at moments, contrasted. For example, Frederiksen describes the differences between responses to a questionnaire administered to university students and his informants (174). How do experiences of “youth” converge or diverge across and within differing groups of “youth” in Batumi? One wonders if the behaviors, feelings, and ways of relating to time are linked to vectors of age, gender, or class. In Frederiksen’s account, one senses that forms of discomfort, psychic distress, and alienation are connected to specific conditions in post-2004 Batumi, Georgia. Scholars of cultural anthropology will enjoy this provocative and stylishly compelling monograph, and will likely see resonances of its themes in other cases in post-socialist (or post-Empire) space.

Perry Sherouse


Douglas P. Fry is to be congratulated for editing “War, Peace, and Human Nature. The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views” (hereafter WP&HN). It is an essential book that should be widely read within anthropology, other human and biological sciences, and by an informed public. It is essential for two reasons. First, it concerns topics that are relevant, to some degree, to the fate of humanity. Second, it treats these topics in as exhaustive a fashion as has yet to appear in print. What are these topics?

They are, as stated in the volume’s title, war, peace, and human nature. War, given its current technology, has the ability to devastate and, for that matter, eliminate humanity. Currently, some type of warring – covert, overt, international, civil, insurgency, counter-insurgency, or terror – occurs across the globe. The fate of humanity for many is peace, that of the grave. Human nature we are informed by certain elite hermeneuts – intellectuals, media, officials, etc., who interpret reality – is in the genes; and those genes are nasty. Let us call this view of human nature the “nasty gene” theory. According to it, genes have evolved to render humans perpetually aggressive, constantly violent; explaining incessant warring and justifying preparing to win it. WP&HN explores the scientific basis of these hermeneuts’ nasty gene theory.

The arguments leading to this finding are presented in twenty-seven chapters, some of which are gems. The editor should be congratulated for providing readers with informative and synthetic introductory and closing chapters. The chapters are arranged in five sections. The first presents ecological and evolutionary models of human nature, especially as they pertain to aggression and war. David P. Barash’s contribution “Evolution and Peace” offers a conclusion, shared by his section co-contributors, that humans “are not biologically obliged to war,” nor are they “predisposed” through “biology to peace” (37). The section might have benefited from considering implications of recent genetic and epigenetic literature for human organized violence. A “new” genetics has emerged in the last three decades, one where the gene has become far less determining, helping to explain why the humans lack biological obligation to war. Readers interested in this genetics might consult Sheldon Krimsky and Jeremy Gruber’s “Genetic Explanations: Sense and Nonsense” (Cambridge 2013).

The second section explores what prehistory has to say about war and peace in the archeological past. This is an important section because some recent archeological literature has claimed war enjoyed a high frequency.